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Abstract 
This essay proposes a reflection on Arundhati Roy’s recent involvement in Dalit politics. 
In particular, it addresses the polemic letter to Roy presented by a group of Dalit 
intellectuals after the publication of a new edition of Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste 
(originally written in 1936), which includes an introductory essay by Roy. The critiques 
against Roy interrogate the right to take part in public life without being able to claim 
“entitlement” or “authenticity.” By discussing the debates over rights to speak and to 
“represent,” this essay offers a reflection on the meaning of a politics of emancipation 
that falls neither into identity politics nor into appropriating the voice of the marginalised. 
Instead, this essay proposes a reappraisal of the value of an “ethics of identification” 
through which outsiders can assume the standpoint of the oppressed and be able to tell 
experiences that they have not lived through. Beyond the rhetoric of belonging, the 
exchange between Roy and her Dalit critics suggests an ethics of identification that 
emphasises the continuing relevance of expressing social consciousness and 
communication across sites of struggle for social justice. 
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The publication of a new annotated edition of Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste in 
2014, with a long introductory essay by Arundhati Roy, “The Doctor and the 
Saint,” sparked a lot of controversy in India and in Europe. An important part of 
this controversy was published in the website Round Table India in March 2014. 
A group of Dalit intellectuals presented an open letter to Arundhati Roy, in which 
they question her ability and her entitlement to “introduce” Annihilation of Caste. 
Neither a Dalit nor a Hindu, how is Roy supposed to “introduce” Ambedkar? 
Why did the publisher choose her to present this important book to 
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contemporary readers? How can Roy’s intervention avoid resulting in the 
appropriation and silencing of Dalit experience? The debates started after the 
online publication of some excerpts from Roy’s introduction and the cancellation 
of the book launch in Hyderabad after threats from alleged Dalit activists, who 
later denied any involvement in preventing the launch. However, Dalit 
intellectuals reacted with anger and resentment to Roy’s introduction. The 
website Round Table India offers an overview of the stakes of this debate. Dalit 
intellectuals have remarked that Roy is not entitled to speak for them and hence 
unentitled to introduce Ambedkar. The following reflections will explore the 
meaning and implications of designating Roy as someone who lacks the title to 
speak and to write. I will propose some thoughts on the value and significance of 
taking part in public life without the right entitlements, authority and without 
being able to claim authenticity. This discussion coincides with a growing interest 
in Dalit literature and politics beyond India, and the related issues of 
representation that emerge from this process. In their introduction to a volume 
on Dalit literature, Joshil K. Abraham and Judith Misrahi-Barak identify a 
potential predicament in writing on Dalit literature: 
 
The problematic of inside and outside has been contentious: the issue of writing 
on or from a Dalit perspective reminds of other debates that have taken place 
in the context of other literatures – such as postcolonial or African American 
literatures. It raises questions of entitlement, authorship, legitimacy and voice, 
appropriation and reclaiming. Whose voice is speaking? Whose pen is writing? 
Who has a right to speak about the Dalits and their literature? (Abraham and 
Misrahi-Barak 4) 
 
Within current, animated discourses on the politics of representation of Dalit 
voices, Gopal Guru makes the point that “the representation of Dalits by non-
Dalits becomes problematic… since it sustains itself on the basis of a permanent 
exclusion of Dalits from the intellectual domain.” However, Gopal Guru suggests 
that there also is a need for an “ethic informed by public accountability.” 
Returning Dalits the authority to claim their own representation is not sufficient 
for “a transformative Dalit politics,” as it prevents “the possibility of Dalits 
acquiring the intellectual leadership to speak in the universal language of 
emancipation” (Guru). The ability to move beyond the politics of representation 
towards a public ethic of emancipation is crucial. In postcolonial criticism, the 
work of Neil Lazarus has superbly demonstrated the need to challenge identity 
politics in favour of a materialist emphasis on universal liberation. In a pivotal 
passage of The Postcolonial Unconscious, Lazarus remarks that universalism is no 
“woolly abstraction” but rather an “active searching out and public presentation 
of connections, contrasts and alternatives” that articulate political demands (199). 
This is also what philosopher Alain Badiou observes in his important critique of 
cultural politics, by suggesting that the political is “less the demand of a social 
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fraction or community to be integrated into the existing order than something 
which touches on a transformation of that order as a whole” (109). The key 
question of whether a non-Dalit can speak on or from a Dalit perspective captures 
the entire problem of an ethics of universal social justice and political 
transformation in a postcolonial world. 
In what follows, I would like to account for the fact that I am writing about 
this debate from a location in Europe and that I am speaking from outside Dalit 
culture. The question addressed to Arundhati Roy – are you entitled to speak at 
all? – is the first question that I intend to pose, by way of reflection, to my own 
writing. An Italian scholar working on questions of public intellectualism in 
postcolonial contexts, my positioning is defined by what critic Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, in Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization, calls a “double 
bind,” an insoluble contradiction. On the one hand, my European location would 
prevent me from claiming any sort of (critical) “authority” on the work of 
Arundhati Roy or the terms of this debate. There is, indeed, a distance between 
myself and the living context of this controversy and the constituencies, social 
movements, representatives that are involved. There is no way to collapse this 
distance. On the other hand, however, after following this debate and reading the 
new edition of Annihilation of Caste – including Roy’s essay – I feel that I cannot 
not learn from and reflect on this debate. My position is marked by an 
impossibility and by an imperative: I cannot and must write at the same time. 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben pointed this out in an influential work on 
ethics by writing that to speak, “to bear witness, is thus to enter into a vertiginous 
movement in which something sinks to the bottom… and something subjectified 
speaks without truly having anything to say of its own (‘I tell things … that I did 
not actually experience’)” (120). This double bind of witnessing is also presented 
in a pivotal essay on the historical experience of the Holocaust by Dori Laub, 
where he writes that “the imperative to tell the story… is inhabited by the 
impossibility of telling” (78-79). However, in Agamben’s reflection on witnessing, 
the ethical question does not concern something that one can recognise as one’s 
own past and own memory: it is the double bind of having to tell – to testify to 
– things that I have not experienced, that are not my own. Agamben defines the 
double bind of the witness as “the impossibility of speaking in his own speech” 
(120) and clarifies that this is the inescapable ethical demand bearing upon the 
witness. Without the distance or gap, there is no space for ethics, because subjects 
remain trapped in identity and immediacy. It is only those who are able to grasp 
and inhabit this gap – at the core of any situation of trauma, struggle, oppression 
and resistance – that can have a glimpse of the problem of testifying and engage 
with it. Even if you are part of the situation and fully entitled to speak, in other 
words, you become a witness if you are able to step outside the immediate and 
perceive a sort of inability to speak, assuming the outside as your own. 
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The key problem in this context is how to turn the impossibility into a 
possibility, and hence define a meaning of the ethical that does not escape, but 
rather builds on the double bind of the testimony: speaking about something that 
one does not own, that is not part of one’s own experience, that is marked by an 
unbridgeable distance. The controversy about Arundhati Roy allowed me to learn 
and to reflect on this key ethical problem that is at the heart of my research. For 
this reason, the subject of this essay does not concern whether Roy is or isn’t the 
right person to introduce Annihilation of Caste. This essay attempts to connect the 
intervention of a South Asian woman writer to problems and issues that are also 
vital in the EU today, especially in relation to the importance of intellectual 
“affiliation” to social movements and collective struggle for social justice. In the 
first part of this essay, I will provide a summary of the key elements of the debate 
that emerged after the publication of “The Doctor and the Saint” and Arundhati 
Roy’s response. In the second part, my reflections will relate this controversy to 
broader questions about public engagement, the role of creative writers in 
postcolonial politics, and the difference between a rhetoric of belonging based 
upon the claim to authenticity and an ethics of identification that builds on 
feelings of solidarity and empathy with the oppressed. The aim of this essay, in 
other words, will not be to intervene in the debate or take sides, but to reflect on the 
interest of this debate for readers that are involved in other sites of struggle and 
protest, yet could strongly benefit and learn from the work of South Asian women 
writers committed to social justice. The conclusion of my essay will elaborate on 
the possibility of placing South Asian women writers in a frame of international 
solidarity that is not merely reiterating the dominance of the jargon of identity 
politics and labelling South Asian writers as native informants. 
 
Who has the Right to Speak? On Commitment and Affiliation 
In their open letter published in Round Table India, the intellectuals of Dalit 
Camera pose 12 questions to Arundhati Roy. They are not mere questions – that 
is, speech acts intended to elicit a genuine answer, which the questioner does not 
yet know – but rather exhortations and, partly, rhetorical questions, to which the 
questioner already knows the answer. Thus, in some of their initial statements, 
Dalit intellectuals ask: 
 
Your essay does not serve the purpose of an introduction to Ambedkar’s 
classic text Annihilation of Caste. You did not track the publication or 
circulation history or even the historic role of Annihilation of Caste in Indian 
society. In what ways you feel that you are competent to introduce this text?… 
Do you share the view that Dalit activists and scholars are better qualified to 
introduce Annihilation of Caste both in terms of their engagement with 
Ambedkar and their life experience? (Dalit Camera) 
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This cluster of questions highlights three important points: first, it claims that 
Roy’s essay does not “serve the purpose” of introducing Ambedkar’s text; 
second, it questions Roy’s “competence” in introducing it and, third, it suggests 
that Dalit scholars are “better qualified” to do it – in terms of their engagement 
and life experience. It is worth noting that these statements adopt a language of 
competence, skill, ability and qualification. The questions do not concern so 
much what Arundhati Roy has written or not written about Ambedkar. The 
lacunae in her writing point to the very fact that she is speaking about his legacy 
today. This is not a discussion about contents or propositions but rather about 
the position of the writer and her supposed status and identity. In her response, 
Roy deals with the first, crucial, issue that is put forward by Dalit Camera. She 
writes: 
 
First of all, on the subject of representation…. Our debate of course is not 
about the political representation of Dalits in general, but whether a non-Dalit 
can/should have written this introduction at all. It is not a new debate, but 
one that the Civil rights movement in the USA, Feminists all over the world, 
the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa, and the Queer Movement deal 
with all the time…. If it is your case that a Dalit writing about Ambedkar will 
have a different reading from a non-Dalit, a privileged caste Hindu, then I 
agree with you -- though I would still exercise caution against essentialism of 
this sort. But to say that every Dalit reading is automatically “authentic” and 
every non-Dalit reading is “misleading” is not something that I agree with. 
The point is, whatever my privileges are – or yours for that matter – are we 
fighting against Brahminism or strengthening it? (“Response to Dalit 
Camera”) 
 
In her answer, Arundhati Roy does not claim that Dalit intellectuals are wrong 
and that, in contrast with what they propose, she has indeed every right to speak 
and to introduce. Roy does not reclaim any kind of entitlement or belonging. On 
the contrary, she agrees with her critics and even concedes their point. In a way, 
she is stressing that they are right: a Dalit would have a different reading. The 
problem is, however, whether this difference is so “different” to prevent Roy 
from understanding things from a Dalit point of view. The fact that she 
emphasises does not concern the “lived experience of being Dalit,” of course, of 
which a Dalit can give a more accurate representation. The question concerns 
whether a non-Dalit can write the introduction to Ambedkar, and whether any 
Dalit reading would be “automatically” correct and authentic. This has to do with 
the formulation of identity politics and the right to speak, but also with an 
understanding of the specific claims that are being made by writers. Roy does not 
seem to deny that Dalit can provide a more accurate description of their situation, 
but this does not prevent her from writing about Ambedkar. The contention in 
this first round of debate between Dalit Camera and Roy is one that cannot be 
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easily solved or dismissed: on the one hand, Dalit Camera have a point when they 
interrogate why Roy has the role of introducing Ambedkar. On the other hand, 
Roy’s answer underlines that non-Dalit “can/should” have the possibility to write 
about Ambedkar and even “introduce” Annihilation of Caste. Roy’s position-taking 
is worth examining, because it captures the ethical dilemma of feeling the 
imperative and simultaneously not having the legitimacy to write about a topic. 
Roy feels the imperative, Dalit Camera emphasise the impossibility: these 
two positions do not need to be seen as mutually exclusive. What can be learned 
from Arundhati Roy’s response is the ability to assume or inhabit critically this 
paradoxical, problematic situation. She rightly points out that this is a key debate 
within the Civil rights movement in USA and in other contexts. Many affinities 
have been proposed between the Dalit movement and black struggle in North 
America, starting from the tradition of connections and exchanges between Dalit 
and Afro-Americans in what Vijay Prashad calls the “Afro-Asian traffic,” and the 
naming of Dalit resistance as “Dalit Panthers” after the “Black Panthers” 
(Gokhale-Turner 77). In other words, the problem of who is entitled to speak is 
already a transversal question: representing means achieving the ability to create 
a contact zone between different contexts of struggle, being involved in an 
exchange with the outside of a community. Also, Roy refers to feminism, a 
movement in which the issue of representation and being legitimised to speak for 
someone else has been central for decades. Thus, in her important response to 
Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s 1988 influential essay, “Under Western Eyes: 
Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” Sara Suleri makes important 
reflections that resonate with Roy’s letter. Suleri writes: 
 
The claim to authenticity – only a black can speak for a black; only a 
postcolonial subcontinental feminist can adequately represent the lived 
experience of that culture – points to the great difficulty posited by the 
‘authenticity’ of female racial voices in the great game that claims to be the 
first narrative of what the ethnically constructed woman is deemed to want. 
(“Woman Skin Deep” 760) 
 
Suleri’s reflections speak to the debate over Roy’s introduction of Ambedkar 
because they reveal a similar problem within the feminist tradition. Western 
feminists have appropriated the voice of Third-World women and hence kept 
them in an “object status,” always spoken for, and silenced by, the subjectivity of 
the representative. Yet, Suleri’s critique of the jargon of authenticity shows that 
by rightly opposing western appropriations of their standpoint, Third-World 
feminists risk becoming a new “first narrative” of what women want: identity 
politics is another form of exclusion, appropriation and silencing. The important 
struggle against restoring the voice of the excluded should avoid merely 
reiterating the same act of exclusion and appropriation of claiming that only some 
are entitled to “represent” by virtue of their innate authenticity. 
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In keeping with Suleri’s critique of Mohanty’s dichotomy, Arundhati Roy 
overcomes a simple “literal” ethic whereby either you are “authentic” and hence 
entitled to speak for your own experience, or you are inauthentic, hence you are 
someone who appropriates and exploits others’ suffering and histories. Roy’s 
response goes beyond this opposition to suggest a third possibility: you can also 
write about Dalit experience, being aware of your own position, yet not 
renouncing the responsibility of witnessing Dalit suffering and expressing your 
solidarity in the struggle for social justice. In the context of Dalit feminism, it has 
been argued that a simple claim to difference is not enough to achieve a truly 
transformative politics. In an important essay on the tradition of Dalit women’s 
struggle, Sharmila Rege suggests the possibility of creating a “Dalit feminist 
standpoint.” She observes:  
 
The Dalit feminist standpoint which emerges from the practices and struggles 
of Dalit woman, we recognise, may originate in the works of Dalit feminist 
intellectuals but it cannot flourish if isolated from the experiences and ideas 
of other groups who must educate themselves about the histories, the 
preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised. A 
transformation from ‘their cause’ to ‘our cause’ is possible for subjectivities 
can be transformed. By this we do not argue that non-Dalit feminists can 
‘speak as’ or ‘for the’ Dalit women but they can ‘reinvent themselves as Dalit 
feminists.’ (Rege 45) 
 
Sharmila Rege provides a convincing critique of identity politics and remarks the 
difficult task of inhabiting a Dalit feminist “standpoint” through which different 
sites of struggle for emancipation could communicate. Her observations also 
stress the crux of the debate: is it possible at all that “their cause” can become 
“our cause?” Can an outsider rightly express solidarity, empathy, even 
identification with the oppressed without silencing their voice? Is such a thing as 
an ethics of identification possible, beyond the politics of representation? This 
set of questions leads to another important cluster of issues posed by Dalit 
Camera in Round Table India, which further problematises Roy’s introduction. 
The Dalit Camera collective write that Roy has “done injustice to Ambedkar’s 
text” and ask whether Roy feels that she is “an authority (in terms of your research 
or involvement in Dalit politics) on Ambedkar” and therefore “competent to 
assess Ambedkar’s position on capitalism, Adivasis, Brahmanism, caste etc” 
(Dalit Camera). They continue: 
 
Dalits feel cheated that you and Navayana GOT all the media attention… but 
the title Annihilation of Caste by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar is just used. Why did you 
use Ambedkar in this manner? Do you feel now that it is unethical? (Dalit 
Camera)  
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These additional questions add the dimension of an “unethical” authorship into 
the debate. Alongside interrogating Roy’s position and identity, Dalit Camera 
want to know more about the real intentions of Arundhati Roy and the effects 
produced by her involvement. Besides interrogating Roy’s entitlement, Dalit 
Camera also question her status and responsibility as a writer: Roy is said to have 
“used” Ambedkar as a pretext to write an essay on Gandhi instead of doing justice 
to Ambedkar. Dalit intellectuals argue that Roy not only appropriates Dalit 
experience, but also assumes the position of an author/authority on Dalit history 
in order to shift attention away from the real issue of Dalit emancipation. They 
argue that the intellectual captures media attention and obscures the reality of the 
oppressed. Arundhati Roy continues her answer by addressing this issue in detail. 
She responds: 
 
I am not a Dalit, I am not a Hindu, and I am not an authority on Ambedkar, 
though I have, unlike many people, including many Dalits, taken the trouble 
to read him. I do not write from a position of authority. I write from the 
position of a writer who engages with things that she feels are important to 
her, and to the society that she lives in. I am sure there are several scholars, 
both Dalit and non-Dalit who are better placed to write an introduction to 
Annihilation of Caste far more knowledgeable than mine. They should go ahead 
and do so. (“Response to Dalit Camera”) 
 
Interestingly, Roy renounces the position of “authority” and rephrases her 
position as a “writer who engages with things that she feels are important to her.” 
This remark could seem very simple to understand and straightforward, but it is 
actually very subtle. Roy is moving the meaning of being authentic from a 
question of identity to the authenticity of her moral imperative, making clear her 
intention and motivation to write. Her position is defined by what is “important 
to her”: instead of writing because there is something that she can claim to 
possess or represent, it is the fact of being a writer that allows her to articulate 
and express what is important to her. A radical reversal has taken place. Dalit 
resistance prompts Arundhati Roy to express her solidarity and “affiliation” to 
the cause of anti-caste struggle. To adopt Edward Said’s famous distinction 
between human bonds made out of biological relations of filiation and critical 
forms of affiliation across different social groups (Said 16), it could be said that 
Roy does not allow her affiliative relationship to become another form of 
filiation. Solidarity created independently is not rooted into a rhetoric of 
belonging. Arundhati Roy does not take part in Dalit politics as a Dalit native 
informant, but she participates in it nonetheless. Dalit Camera seem to be able to 
see things only from the other point of view: your filiation is what prompts you 
to political engagement. For Roy, it is political engagement that prompts forms 
and occasions of social affiliation. This is not mere reversal of identity politics 
but the envisioning of another politics, and another ethics, altogether. Dalit 
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Camera’s reproach that Roy is “using” Ambedkar and hence being “unethical” 
does not fully engage with the possible meaning of an ethics of identification that 
depends on intention and motivation instead of claims of authority. 
 
On Adopting the Experience of Living Others 
The problematic relationship between affiliation and commitment raised by the 
debate between Roy and Dalit Camera is highly relevant to current discourses on 
postcolonial ethics and politics. A thoughtful investigation of the possibility of 
being able to represent experiences and histories that one has not lived through 
can be found in Marianne Hirsch’s theory of post-memory: the memory of what 
one has not experienced. The concept of post-memory is based on the possibility 
of transmitting traces of traumatic events by generations of descendants of the 
victims. Will future generations be able to remember things that they have not 
suffered? How will they articulate their entitlement, right to speak and 
“authority,” even if there are no direct survivors left? Hirsch asks: 
 
If we thus adopt the traumatic experiences of others as experiences that we 
might ourselves have lived through, if we inscribe them into our own life 
story, can we do so without imitating or unduly appropriating them? (Hirsch 
114) 
 
Hirsch’s ethical dilemma points to the ability to adopt the trauma and suffering of 
others as our own. This is a central question, one that could be raised in relation 
to the exchange between Arundhati Roy and Dalit Camera: can anyone adopt the 
traumatic experience of others? Would the historical experience of Dalit 
oppression and resistance be communicable by a non-Dalit? Hirsch’s words 
emphasise a vital issue, yet the controversy over Roy’s essay on Ambedkar 
extends this interrogative to reach a wider temporal and spatial dimension, 
beyond Europe and beyond the reference to “memory.” Indeed, what Hirsch 
develops in the context of memory, especially as regards memories of the 
Holocaust, has wider implications and needs to be expanded in order to include 
the problem of being able to adopt the experiences of others who are living and 
continuing to endure oppression and to manifest resistance in the present. It is 
not just past suffering that has to be accounted for: the tradition of the oppressed 
requires attention to the present as well. The question concerns whether there is 
someone who is able to assume as her own what remains unsaid of the 
exploitation, violence and marginalisation that are being carried out on oppressed 
groups.  
Indeed, this is not so much a question of being able to remember but rather 
to identify with something that one does not experience oneself. It is more about 
witnessing rather than just recollecting. As Agamben notes, witnessing implies 
being able to “place oneself in one’s own language in the position of those who 
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have lost it” (161). The point is not only to be able to reminisce about past things 
that are at risk of disappearing, but to mobilise this process in order to act upon 
the present. The ethical quest needs to turn into a politics. Furthermore, rather 
than restricting the acts of postmemory to the realm of filiation – our family, our 
group or lineage – the ethical double bind of witnessing triggers what critic Kaja 
Silverman calls a process of “heteropathic identification”: an act that introduces 
in my memories and my story “not only what resides outside the given-to-be-seen, 
but what my moi excludes – what must be denied in order for myself to exist as 
such” (185). Heteropathic identification would, in other words, “introduce the 
‘not me’ into my memory reserve’”(185). This would correspond to Alison 
Landsberg’s notion of a form of identification “structured not on sameness and 
similarity, but on distance and difference” (225). The point is to develop the 
ability to identify with the other, in order to introduce an element of otherness, 
critique and distance within ourselves. In the case of Arundhati Roy’s debate with 
Dalit Camera, the witness is the one who is able to place oneself in the position 
of those who are oppressed, even if they have not lost their language, because they are living 
and they are able to speak. Assuming a Dalit standpoint is an epistemological act that 
does not aim at appropriating Dalit experience, but at becoming able to listen to 
Dalit perspectives by identifying with them; it is the precondition to challenging 
caste-blindness. Instead of being based on the absence of the other, the ethical 
dimension that can be learned from Arundhati Roy’s commitment concerns the 
ability to witness what is living and present. It also guarantees exposure to 
questions and responses by Dalit intellectuals. From this point of view, the online 
exchange over Ambedkar’s introduction is highly precious and instructive for 
thinking ethical and political engagement in the twenty-first century. The last 
extract from Dalit Camera’s questions that I report in this essay reveals the 
intention behind this interrogation of Roy’s role and entitlements. Dalit Camera 
write: 
 
The intention has always been to raise criticism of your role in the preparation 
of the edited book and also the contents of your introduction.  Many Dalit 
activists including myself are not pleased with your introduction and the 
planning of the event and publicity around your book and your star status…. 
The intention is not to stall the event or to ban your views but to make our 
point that you did not do justice to Annihilation of Caste. (Roy, “An Open 
Letter”) 
 
This passage reveals that the Dalit constituencies that Roy is supposed to be 
representing or even “patronising” are indeed able to express their voice and be 
heard. The value of Roy’s intervention also rests on her ability to cause a response 
from Dalit intellectuals. Her answer, indeed, ends with the exhortation that Dalit 
and non-Dalit scholars write another introduction to Annihilation of Caste. 
Whereas Dalit critics attack Roy for her compliance with capitalism – her star 
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status and publicity for the event – their use of the internet as an arena to voice 
their views suggests that both Roy and Dalit intellectuals are contributing to the 
making of a common public sphere that goes beyond the Subcontinent. The 
circulation of the debate beyond Dalit activists reveals potentialities for 
constructing political solidarities and the role of intellectuals in taking part in 
social movements. Whereas Roy has been described by critics as a “messiah” and 
as a “star,” her interventions often take the form of declarations, statements of 
solidarity, or reports that do not claim to be “representing” Dalit voices but rather 
to indicate the possibility to adopt their position as our own. Roy’s ethics of 
identification suggests the attempt to create affiliations among people in struggle. 
In contrast with what François Laruelle calls the “dominant” or media-
friendly intellectual, Roy’s interventions need to be read as “declarations” of a 
committed writer: declarations and position-takings rather than a manifesto, and 
her position as a writer should not be confused with the claims of a prophet or a 
messiah. The concept of writing a “declaration” rather than a manifesto has been 
expressed recently by two important political thinkers, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri, who also had to confront the issue of writing about things that 
they do not “represent.” In their case, the movement was not the Dalit movement 
but the social movements of protest initiated in 2011 in North Africa, which are 
still continuing today in many locations of the globe. Hardt and Negri published 
a short reflection in the online journal Jacobin, where they present their thoughts 
in the form of a declaration on current events rather than any sort of manifesto. 
They write: 
 
Manifestos work like the ancient prophets, who by the power of their vision 
create their own people. Today’s social movements have reversed the order, 
making manifestos and prophets obsolete. Agents of change have already 
descended into the streets and occupied city squares, not only threatening and 
toppling rulers but also conjuring visions of a new world. (Hardt and Negri, 
“Take Up the Baton”) 
 
People are already fighting and forging new political alliances in streets and city 
squares. They do not need any sort of prophet or super-star to indicate the way. 
Fully aware of this, Arundhati Roy never claimed any leadership or authority to 
“represent” Dalit, Adivasi or any other oppressed community. Her work 
problematises any conjuring of homogeneous entities such as “the people” and 
always points to the differential claims, exigencies and forms of oppression 
through which people in struggle define themselves. Reading Arundhati Roy also 
solicits reflections on the possibility of identifying with the oppressed, beyond 
the logic of stardom and publicity. Intellectuals such as Roy have today assumed 
the role of articulating and critically expressing movements that already have a 
voice and an existence. Roy embodies the “traditions of rational thought in our 
intellectual heritage” that, according to Romila Thapar, have marked the social 
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function of public thinkers in the Subcontinent since Antiquity. Her role as 
intellectual corresponds to the reflections proposed by Hardt and Negri in their 
declaration, where they remark that the “task is not to codify new social relations 
in a fixed order, but instead to create a constituent process that organizes those 
relations and makes them lasting while also fostering future innovations and 
remaining open to the desires of the multitude” (“Take Up the Baton”). 
Intellectuals do not have the function to tell people what they should do, or who 
they are. But, precisely for this reason, intellectuals are still needed, if they are able 
to assume the role of organising existing relations, making them last and keeping 
them open to future changes. The intellectual should inhabit the position of a 
custodian or a keeper of living realities that are already being shaped, instead of 
aiming to fix them into a frame. Roy’s reply to her critics points to this task of 
making the struggle last, forging new connections and keeping anti-caste struggle 
open to new inclusions and solidarities. 
 
Conclusion: Beyond the Rhetoric of Belonging 
In an important essay on the differences between slavery and untouchability, 
Ambedkar wrote that “if a man is deprived of his liberty indirectly he has no 
consciousness of his enslavement. Untouchability is an indirect form of 
slavery…. It is enslavement without making the Untouchables conscious of their 
enslavement…. It is real though it is indirect. It is enduring because it is 
unconscious” (Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches 15). In societies that reproduce 
such forms of “indirect” and “unconscious” enslavement and oppression, an 
ethic of identification can help articulate a public consciousness of inequality and 
social injustice. This does not imply that engaged writers have a vanguard, 
leadership or spokesperson “entitling” role that would enable them to speak for 
oppressed groups. Those able to identify with the oppressed do not speak the 
“truth” to power, nor do they represent “the people.” But they can help formulate 
a public consciousness of oppression.  
The ethics of identification means the ability to assume the standpoint of the 
other in order to contribute to a political transformation of society as a whole. 
For this reason, Dalit intellectuals can rightly claim that they do not “need” 
Arundhati Roy to express their experience and fight for their rights. She is 
presented as  engaged writer caught between her non-Dalit position and her Dalit 
position-taking. Without claiming any Dalit identity, however, Roy expresses 
solidarity and forms of identification with Dalit resistance that put commitment 
before belonging, affiliation before filiation, critique before identity. The interest 
of Roy’s intervention has to do, precisely, with her ability to formulate public 
awareness of experiences that are not her own and that she cannot claim to 
“represent.” Instead of writing about the past, the intellectual assumes the 
function of the keeper of the revolt of the present; she is someone who registers 
what is happening and adds one more voice to the voices that are already 
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speaking. Roy does not defy the problematic, even paradoxical act of feeling the 
imperative and being reminded of the impossibility of narrating “authentic” Dalit 
historical experiences. But she is definitely aware of her position as engaged writer. 
In an interview with Siddhartha Deb published in the New York Times the same 
year of the publication of the new edition of Annihilation of Caste, Roy writes, in 
relation to her role as creative writer and author of a novel: 
 
I’m not a person who likes to use fiction as a means. I think it’s an irreducible 
thing, fiction. It’s itself. It’s not a movie, it’s not a political tract, it’s not a 
slogan. The ways in which I have thought politically, the proteins of that have 
to be broken down and forgotten about, until it comes out as the sweat on 
your skin. (Deb) 
 
If this statement applies to fiction, how do her literary abilities feed into her 
nonfictional writing? Could her introduction to Annihilation of Caste be read 
differently, starting from this declaration? Instead of providing a slogan or a 
manifesto, Arundhati Roy’s engagement is a process in which political thought 
“comes out” as “sweat on your skin”: it is the expression of a condition that is 
not innate or inherent to her but rather acquired with continuous effort, critical 
reflection and engagement. The model of politics indicated through Roy’s 
response to her critics enables other intellectuals to go beyond their own position, 
or rather take new positions in the attempt to construct new forms of social 
affiliation, alongside people who are already struggling in the streets and city 
squares. In the context of defining their intellectual position in their 
“declaration,” Hardt and Negri refer to the example of Invisible Man, Ralph 
Ellison’s novel on racial discrimination in the USA, and write:  
 
Ralph Ellison’s invisible man, after an arduous journey through a racist 
society, developed the ability to communicate with others in struggle. ‘Who 
knows,’ Ellison’s narrator concludes, ‘but that, on the lower frequencies, I 
speak for you?’ Today, too, those in struggle communicate on the lower 
frequencies, but, unlike in Ellison’s time, no one speaks for them. The lower 
frequencies are open airwaves for all. And some messages can be heard only 
by those in struggle. (“Take Up the Baton”) 
 
On the lower frequencies, the exchange between Roy and her critics can indicate 
a new model for political engagement, whereby writing is always embedded in a 
relationship to living, speaking, vocal constituencies that do not need anyone to 
speak for them. Yet, on the lower frequencies, these kinds of exchanges can 
contribute to formulating a public consciousness of oppression: beyond the 
rhetoric of belonging, the ethics of identification involves the ability to assume 
the position of the oppressed, without appropriating it, but in order to foster a 
truly political transformation of society. 
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